Accelerating health technologies (AHT)

Market design to accelerate COVID-19 vaccine supply: Build more capacity, and stretch what we already have.

Read full article in Science.

Each month, COVID-19 kills hundreds of thousands of people, reduces global gross domestic product (GDP) by hundreds of billions of dollars, and generates large, accumulating losses to human capital by harming education and health (1–4). Achieving widespread immunization 1 month faster would thus save many lives and mitigate short- and long-run economic harm. Although the value of vaccines may seem obvious, government action and investment in vaccines have not been commensurate with the enormous scale of benefits, with many countries not likely to achieve widespread immunization until the end of 2022.

We estimate below that installed capacity for 3 billion annual vaccine courses has a global benefit of $17.4 trillion, over $5,800 per course. Investing now in expanding capacity for an additional annual 1 billion courses could accelerate completion of widespread immunization by over 4 months, providing additional global benefits of $576 to $989 per course. This dwarfs prices of $6 to $40 per course seen in deals with vaccine producers, indicating the wide gap between social and commercial incentives. We urge governments and international organizations to contract with vaccine producers to further expand capacity and encourage measures described below to “stretch” existing capacity (such as lower-dose regimens) and efficiently allocate courses (such as a cross-country vaccine exchange).

How to vaccinate the world

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Michael Kremer is interviewed by Tim Harford for the BBC, and discusses incentives for vaccine development and production with Anna Mouser of the Wellcome Trust and Patrick Tippo of Biovac in South Africa.

Preparing for a Pandemic: Accelerating Vaccine Availability

Read the full article at NBER.

Vaccinating the world’s population quickly in a pandemic has enormous health and economic benefits. We analyze the problem faced by governments in determining the scale and structure of procurement for vaccines. We analyze alternative approaches to procurement. We find that if the goal is to accelerate the vaccine delivery timetable, buyers should directly fund manufacturing capacity and shoulder most of the risk of failure, while maintaining some direct incentives for speed. We analyzed the optimal portfolio of vaccine investments for countries with different characteristics as well as the implications for international cooperation. Our analysis, considered in light of the experience of 2020, suggests lessons for future pandemics.